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I. Introduction
In most developing countries financial markets are still "highly
fragmented and dualistic" (Nunnenkamp 1985, p. 20). This is con-
sidered as a hindering factor to economic development. The ra-
tionale behind this is the view shared by most economists that a
higher level of financial integration c.p. lowers intermediation
costs, encourages competition and improves the allocation of
loanable funds throughout the economy.
If these are ultimate goals of financial integration, which
intermediate objectives can be strived for? For example:
- the substitution of "unproductive" assets" - in view of the
2 financial intermediation process- by "productive assets" ;
- the withdrawal of discriminatory measures against informal
financial activities that play "an important complementary
role" (Nunnenkamp 1985, p. 21) with regard to formal financial
savings and/or credits ;
- .the competition for customers of informal money lenders, whose
credit transactions are connected with severe market imper-
fections by. adequate and possibly new formal financial inter-
mediaries;
- the overall reduction if not abolution of financial repression
within the formal financial sector.
More alternatives could be added, but the examples given should
suffice.
As hoarding of gold jewellery (Fischer 1987, p. 23).
2 '
Informal credits and/or deposits with the formal financial
sector.
As savings and credit associations.- 2 -
Indonesia is an example for a country that ha pursued different
approaches towards the financial sector in the last years; each
of these will most likely have affected financial integration:
(i) the "macroeconomic approach": the so-called June 1, 1983
Financial Reform which enabled state banks to determine
their own credit terms vis-a-vis to the non-priority sec-
tors as well as interest rates on most categories of de-
posits. One major goal of this reform was to improve the
"allocation of financial resources through the financial
system" (Balino/Sundararajan 1984, p. 1).
(ii) the "small-scale approach": The KIK/KMKP programs launched
in 1974 with the aim of extending concessional credit to
small-scale enterprises (SSE). Formal eligibility criteria
are (i) the business' net worth which originally should not
"exceed RP 100 million in industry and construction, or RP
40 million in other sectors" (Bolnick 1982, p. 66) and (ii)
that the enterprise is owned by indigenous people (pri-
bumi). The explanation of such policy is that the financial
market "would otherwise seriously underallocate credit to
SSE" (ibid, p. 80/81) .
(iii) the "institutional approach": the implementation of a
system of small banks, called "Bank Perkreditan Rakyat"
(BPR) in 1978, built up under the supervision of Bank
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), which is the biggest (state-owned)
commercial bank specialized in granting agriculture,
fishery, cooperative and rural development credits. The
main purpose was to create a new bank type with lower mar-
ket access restrictions for savers and borrowers than the
existing formal financial institutions.
Small Investment Credit/Permanent Working Capital Credit.- 3 -
(i) and (ii) have already been discussed (Nunnenkamp 1985;
Bruch/Hiemenz 1984; Bolnick 1982) to some extent in the litera-
ture. This paper intends to focus on (iii) and the possible im-
pact it had on trade-tied informal lending which traditionally
has been a widespread phenomenon in Indonesia (Bank Indonesia
1985, p. 20) and is incriminated to often imply exploitation of
borrowers. The presentation is as follows: any investigation into
the possible repercussions of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat's imple-
mentation presupposes the discussion of the theoretical links
between formal and informal finance. This is done in Section II.
In III the characteristics of "trading-cum-money lending" in
Indonesia are discussed, whereas IV gives an overview on the new
Indonesian small bank type properties. The empirical findings in
V may show if this new bank type has had any substantial impact
on the relevance of trade-tied money lending. To this end spatial
data will be analyzed. Finally, in VI a summary is given, includ-
ing some policy conclusions.
II. The Links Between Formal and Informal Finance
Acharya and Madhur (1983, 1984) belong to those who have made
attempts at modelling the nature of interactions between the
informal and the formal credit markets. Their approach used time
series of bazar bill rates of major business centres in India -
which is the rate of discount on these - as a proxy for informal
interest rates. They measured spill-over effects through the
impact of a credit demand switch on informal interest rates: "A
reduction in the stock of commercial bank credit to the private
sector leads to an increase in the excess demand in the commer-
cial bank credit market which then spills over to the informal
credit market and thereby leads to an increase in the rate of
interest in the latter market" (1983, p. 1755). Their paper led
to a controversy with Sundaram and Pandit (1984, 1985) who kept
to the Acharya-Madhur-Model-specification but used a different
data base: according to them "the ... hypothesis that the ...
bill market and the organized credit market are (i) segmented,
cannot be rejected out of hand" (1984, p. 677).- 4 -
In a cross-sectional context there are at least two more alter-
natives: it could be that the informal credit market satisfies
demand needs complementary (ii) to the formal credit market, but
one could also think of a (iii) competitive or substitutionary
relationship.
In the following, a graphical'illustration for all three cases
will be presented.
As Roemer (1986, p. 435) already explained, some lenders in de-
veloping countries - "money-lenders, traders and family members -
operate only in the unorganized sector". Let us consider the case
of competition between banks and traders first. Graph 1 depicts
formal credit supply and demand (Sp, Dp) before and after the
introduction of a new bank type (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat) which
has lower market access restrictions (m) than the yet existing
formal financial institutions in the region. As a consequence,
total formal credit demand will c.p. rise (DFQ -• D .) . But also
supply will (spo -»• S ,) , assuming, "that any lender who can place
money in the organized market at an acceptable rate will do so
rather than" (Roemer 1986, p. 434/435) remain in the unorganized
sector. The trader's credit supply will shrink (S_,o •*• S ,) . Most
likely, the additional formal credit demand is due to agents who
take the chance of a new formal institution with adequate con-
ditions to change the debtor (D Q ->• D ..) .
As a result, in the new equilibrium formal credits provide an
additional part (AF) of the total loanable funds (L) available to
the region. To this extent, the amount of informal credits sank
(IFQ -»• IF.,) caused in the end by the bank's competition!
Alternatively, a complementary function of the new bank type may
be thought of, represented by Graph 2x if the banks draw resour-
ces from non-traders and win customers not involved in trade
tied-in credit arrangements, the loanable funds available to the
region can rise (LQ •»• L.,) without affecting the trader's credit
market negatively (IF0 = IF.) . This event may be brought about by
a process of financial deepening: people depositing for the first- 5 -
GRAPH V
"COMPETITION"
L^Loanable Funds available in the region
i=interest rate
F=Formal Credits by Banks
IF=Informal Credits by Traders
0-p=Formal Credit Supply Origin
0^=Informal Credit Supply Origin- 6 -
GRAPH 2
"COMPLEMENTARITY"
L=Loanable Funds available in the region
i=interaet rate
F= Formal Credits by Banks
IF=Informal Credits by Traders
0-p=Formal Credit Supply Origin
Om=Informal Credit Supply Origin- 7 -
time their money with banks, and small scale entrepreneurs who
relied before totally on self-financing, now becoming first-
time-borrowers.
Finally, let us consider in Graph 3 the case of segmentation: Now
we introduce a third credit/second informal credit market extend-
ing loans in the initial equilibrium in the amount of IF.._, with
the trader's credit remaining at IF_0. ^
n
e
 could think of a dif-
ferent set of lenders ("pure money lenders", family members,
housewives etc.) and borrowers in comparison to the trader's
credit market. It is characterized by the fact that it is
"closer" to the banks' market in the sense that the expansion of
the bank's market share will in the first phase always be at its
expense (
IFi0 "*" IF.,) . Thus, the above explained shift (Dp0 •*•
D .; S „ ->• S .) does not affect trader's credit segment (IF,,..).
Only if the second informal credit market has been competed away,
will the banks knock on the trader's credit market door.
III. The Characteristics of Trading-Cum-Lending in Indonesia
It is a widespread view that informal money markets matter in
developing countries (Fischer 1986, p. 123-128, 169-170): the
informal money (or better: credit) market (ICM) is successful in
providing finance easily, quickly and with flexible conditions
and repayment terms (Fischer 1987, p. 26) to small borrowers in
urban and rural areas. The failure of formal financial
institutions to reach these customers has been attributed - among
other things - to the fact that they adhere to bureaucratic
procedures, do not provide complementary services, ask for
collateral etc.
If a typology of informal credit arrangements - which can be
found nowadays in Indonesia - should be given, the following have
proven to be the most frequent (BI 1985, p. 19):
"The credit market... becomes segmented between borrowers with
collateral, who obtain lower cost loans from informal... in-
stitutions, and borrowers without collateral, who pay higher





F=Formal Credits by Banks
IF.=Informal Credits by Non-Traders
IFp=Informal Credits by Traders
0F=Formal Credit Supply Origin
0T=Informal Credit Supply Origin- 9 -
(a) Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
(b) Credit Cooperatives
(c) Labor and Land Related Credit Arrangements
(d) Private Pawnbrokers
(e) "Pure" Money Lenders
(f) Trade Linked Lending
This paper deals basically with (f) : In Indonesia, trade linked
lending has primarily two aspects: firstly, we find - for in-
stance in West Kalimantan, Jambi, Jakarta etc. - the practice of
CEK-PUTIH (Sell 1987), which is nothing but a system of circulat-
ing "white checks" as an in-group instrument of payment and/or
credit. Secondly, there is lending by traders to non-traders.
TENGKULAKS (middlemen) and BAKULS (vendors), for example, are
involved in these transactions. Bakuls can be found preferably in
the rural sector: in their majority they purchase village pro-
ducts and provide both credit and input factors. They are used to
sell some products on credit and to make purchases of outputs
in advance. It is important to realize that the advances in
goods, raw materials and funds function as one joint transaction.
In the case of cultivators, these are obliged to deliver the
crops to the creditors at harvest time. As a consequence, when
their harvest produce is not adequate to meet their debts, their
commitment towards the small traders continues ... . Therefore,
it is argued, the creditors tend to gain some sort of monopo-
listic power in the credit market, reflected on the "real side of
the economy" by a monopsony power in the product market . High
Bhaduri (1977, pp. 343/44) illustrates this power in the con-
text of agrarian credit markets: "The functioning of unor-
ganized rural money markets is inextricably interwoven with
personal power relations in the villages, consequently giving
such markets their personalised character... Thus, a local
money-lending trader through whom the borrowing peasant markets
his harvest, is usually in a much stronger position than a
lender in an organized market to recover defaulted loans, using
such means as ... the forthcoming harvest, etc. It is this high
degree of personal power over the borrower which allows a pri-
vate money-lender to accept a whole range of securities as
collaterals for advancing loans which would otherwise be un-
acceptable. But on the other hand, the "unmarketability" of
these collaterals elsewhere also gives a private money-lender
the exceptional economic power arbitrarily to value the col-
laterals offered by poor peasants".- 10 -
effective interest rates are a "natural" outcome: Their calcu-
lation depends on the overpricing of commodities sold by the
merchants and the purchase of the farm products at a "discounted"
price (underpricing) .
As a consequence, it has been claimed that the institutionalized
credit sector should not complement this type of informal credit
arrangement but compete with, and where possible, compete away
from the informal credit lenders involved.
Tengkulaks are not confined to the rural sector but will be found
in urban areas, too. Their customers consist less of small pea-
sants; more frequently these are running small-scale enterprises
with the need to finance part of their working capital by ex-
ternal finance inflows. Typically lacking from collateral they
address their credit wishes to professional money lenders and
Tengkulaks. The latter provide their credits in a way similar to
the Bakuls: the supply of intermediate goods and of funds is an
interlinked contract. In comparison to the Bakuls less is known
about the significance of monopoly power "in explaining the
interest rates charged" (Fischer 1987, p. 27). But there are no
relevant sources indicating that this element is absent.
IV. Properties of the New Indonesian Small Bank Type
At first glance (see Graph 4) it seems that Bank Perkreditan
Rakyat represents a huge variety of different bank types. This is
at the same time true and not true: On the one hand, all kinds of
specific "realizations" can be traced back to three basic types:
(i) the urban banks (Bank Pasar); (ii) the village banks provid-
ing credit in kind (Lumbung Desa) and (iii) extending loans in
As Gangopadhyay and Sengupta put it, "credit market imper-
fections manifest themselves in the underpricing of the product
of the farmer" (1987, p. 341). But one could add that over-
priced consumption goods contribute to these "imperfections"
too. Thus, it is the effective interest rate which matters with
the here and there observed apparently low nominal interest
rates charged by small traders being irrelevant.Graph
Bank Perkreditan Rakyat
Badan Kredit Desa(BKD)
Bank Desa Lumbung Desa Bank (Kerya Produksi) Desa (BKPD) "PerusahaanDaerah"(PD) "Perseroan Terbatas" (PT) "Koperasi"(KOP) "Maskapai Andil lndonesia"(MAI)
(Labour Products) (Manufacturing Products) (Joint-Stock-Company) (Cooperative) (Indonesian Share Company)
Bank Pasar Bank Desa BankPasar Bank Desa Bank Pasar Bank Desa Bank Pasar Bank Desa
(Non BKB/BKPD)
Source: Bank Indonesia- 12 -
cash (Bank Desa) . What do they have in common? Their status is
either private (Bank Swasta, Badan Kredit Desa) or regional
government/village government owned (Bank Pemerintah). They
collect time and savings deposits like any other commercial bank
and they make their living out of giving credits to small
customers/small-scale enterprises. Worth mentioning are the facts
that they do not have any credit-volume-restrictions for single
customers, operate only locally with an employee collecting per-
sonally interest rate payments from the debtors. Due to relative-
ly high overhead costs - so bank officials say - the interest
rates charged are slightly higher than those of the big banks.
And they are far away from being unanimous in every region as
well. On the other hand, the organization of Bank Pemerintah
follows a "product principle" whereas Bank Swasta differentiates
as to the "principle of capital ownership". No further distinc-
tions are made as far as Badan Kredit Desa is concerned.
The macroeconomic relevance of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR),
which is still under supervision of BRI, is reflected by a 1
percent share in total outstanding credits of Indonesian banks at
the end of 1984. In 1983, 82% of credits extended were for
"productive purposes".
Since June 1, 1983, the banks compounding BPR did not receive any
more direct credits by Bank Indonesia, which was until then a
source of subsidized refinancing. Each single bank calculates its
own interest rates on deposits/credits with the only "recommen-
dation" being a preference for small customers. In the context of
our topic it is important to realize that Bank Perkreditan Rakyat
has been set up - among other things - to compete with profes-
sional money lenders/traders-cum-money lenders for small
customers.BibiioineK
Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft - 13 -
V. Empirical Results
The role of a financial intermediary belongs to the most impor-
tant functions traders have in developing countries (Al-Ani/
Geschka 1968, p. 728). This applies to Indonesia, also. First of
all, one has to realize the fact that trading in LDC's is mostly
allocated in the informal sector: As Sethuraman points out, in
Indonesia a "significant feature of the informal sector, espe-
cially in urban areas, is the predominance of tertiary acti-
vities" (Sethuraman 1985, p. 719) . Following the Population
Census of Indonesia in 1980 he estimates "that 55 per cent of
2 informal sector employment in urban Indonesia was in" (ibid, p.
729) the tertiary sector: trade (49%), transport (5.4%) and
finance and related services (0.19%). The last figure, however,
is misleading: the majority of informal trading activities are in
one way or another tied to the often so-called "unorganized money
market": A recent (1985) case study on small and medium business
in Indonesia (Rahardjo 1985, p. 50) disclosed some interesting
facts: small scale traders locate 55% of their savings outside
banks, cooperatives and their own group. On the other hand, re-
sponding small scale establishments declared that more than 40%
of their external capital inflow stemmed from "other sources"
(ibid, p. 44) with interest rates per month varying between 5 and
30 per cent (ibid, p. 44) . The "other sources", in turn, were
identified primarily as Tengkulaks (see above) and money lenders.
As was explained above both Tengkulaks and Bakuls can be charac-
terized by a "lending-selling-tie" or interlinked contracts with
their customers, where an artificial separation between "pure
trading" and "pure lending" is meaningless. The assumption that
the vast majority of Indonesian small traders are either Bakuls
or Tengkulaks does not seem to be too far from reality.
According to Ananta/Tjiptoherijanto (1985, p. 36) in 1980, 70%
of the workers in the informal sector "were in sector S, that
is, the commerce, finance and service sectors" (ibid).
2
On the other hand, it has been estimated "that the percentage
of workers in the informal sector is larger in the villages
than in the cities" (Ananta/Tjiptoherijanto 1985, p. 37).- 14 -
Hence, the average number of small traders located in a well-
defined area is now chosen as a proxy for the spatial avail-
1 2
ability of small traders's informal credits .
Tables 1 gives the figures for different points in time:
Table 1: The Number of Small Traders in Indonesia, 1977-1981 and 1984
All Provinces (26)
Total Ain % Average
Provinces with Bank Perkreditan
Rakyat (12)






































































This absolute figure does not reveal the density of trader's
credit supply which would have to take into account the popu-
lation of the relevant area and/or indicators for the size of
economic activities. However, the correlation coefficient
between the distribution of population over provinces and the
occurrence of small traders in these is only 0.45 (surprisingly
for both samples) , when data from the 1980 population census
are used. The coefficient is not significant at the 0.01 level
of error probability.
With provinces being the smallest spatial unit traders can be
attached to. If it is argued that a comparison of provinces'
averages is only legitimate when (1) relative dispersion of
traders is alike and (2) the different sizes of provinces are
considered, the following figures back the procedure chosen: in
1980 the variable "small traders per square km" has a norma-
lized variation coefficient of 0.897 in the 26-provinces-case
and of 0.939 in the 12-provinces-case. Thus, the relative dis-
persion per distance unit is very similar.- 15 -
Basically, Table 1 demonstrates:
(i) Small traders' credit availability in the bank-provinces
area is persistently higher than on a national level ;
(ii) After 1978 the appearance of small traders diminished
remarkably; this was especially true for the bank-pro-
vinces;
(iii) As a consequence, the share of small traders located in
bank-provinces in the total of small traders over all the
economy decreased.
Therefore, tentative conclusions from Table 1 would be that
- small traders became less important for the extension of in-
2
formal credits for the economy as a whole ,
- the bank provinces became less interesting for the small tra-
ders .
The first conclusion can hardly be attributed to financial li-
beralization in general (after June 1, 1983) as the tendency
towards "disappearance" of small traders had already started in
1979, at a time when overall financial repression was fully at
work. As far as "financial factors" are concerned one has to make
allowance for the possibility that competitors in the field of
informal credits (Credit Unions, Credit and Savings Associations)
have been able to partly push small traders back, as they could
offer the better credit conditions.
This fact could be taken as a sort of justification for Bank
Perkreditan Rakyat to set up its business, in order to reduce
the "monopolistic" power of traders.
2
Given also the fact that the population of Indonesia rises by a
percentage of 2... per year (2.3% between 1971 and 1980).- 16 -
Although, we have to consider some arguments which shed light on
the fact, that there are indeed other factors influencing small
traders in their decision to either leave or not to leave their
present job:
(i) A rising real income per capita for the whole economy - as
it can be stated for Indonesia in the last ten years
will generally be accompanied by an increased level of
demand for final and/or intermediate goods. That would -
other things being equal - tend to induce a higher number
of people engaged in trading.
(ii) However, if the increased level of demand goes with a
changed structure of demand - with goods typically offered
by small traders experiencing a relative decline - a con-
stancy or even a fall in the number of small traders may be
the outcome.
(iii) A decreasing number of small traders should also be seen as
a result of macroeconomic sectoral shifts: as Wirosardjono
(1985, p. 78/79) reports, "the trade sector actually showed
a decline from 14.4 per cent in 1976 to 13.0 per cent in
2
1980... "as far as absorption of labour was concerned..."
(iv) Indonesia has been improving its transport and communi-
cations system considerably in the last 15 years; this
enabled traders to reach distant villages more easily than
before. It can support some sort of willingness to disperse-
over a country. Also, it allows large traders who can
afford costs for transportation to displace small traders
to some extent.
1 ADB 1986, pp. 1,7.
2
During the same time period trade's share in GDP declined from
16.5 to 14.1 per cent (ADB 1986, p. 167). In other words: la-
bour productivity in the trading sector grew by 2.5 per cent
less than for the total economy.- 17 -
(v) "An informal sector trader may prefer to remain where he is
(and what he is, the author) rather than enter manufactur-
ing, which will yield a return of 20 per cent on the capital
invested because he (himself, the author) has to borrow from
local money lenders at exorbitant rates of interest..."
(Sethuraman 1985, p. 719). But this argument can be reversed
in an environment of decreasing average informal interest
rates. They make c.p. trading-cum-lending less attractive;
small traders may then indeed prefer entering manufacturing
and "profit" from improved credit conditions .
(vi) Another aspect is given by S.M. Plattner: During the devel-
opment of regional systems of exchange "... some of the
rural villages become the sites of periodic markets. This
occurs as a consequence of increases in demand intensity and
decreases in the costs of transportation for farmers rela-
tive to the opportunity costs of farm work not done while
they are travelling" (Plattner 1976, p. 77). Thus the me-
diation part played by traders is noticeably reduced in
importance with small traders being more vulnerable to this
effect than medium and large traders.
More general factors with influence on the phenomenon of decreas-
ing numbers of small traders in Indonesia could probably be
added. On the other hand, following the principle of insufficient
reason ("Prinzip des unzureichenden Grundes") we have no argument
in particular why the mentioned aspects ((i) through (vi)) should
have had a stronger impact on the subsample (12 provinces) than
on the total economy (26 provinces). Thus, the introduction of a
new bank type may indeed have helped to push away Bakuls and
In comparison to 1978 (21.6%) the average ratio of gross
domestic savings to GDP for the subsequent years (1979-1984)
rose by 3.3 percentage points (24.9%, ADB 1986, pp. 169/179).- 18 -
Tengkulaks ! Their trading function can be taken over today quite
easily by medium and large traders, as explained in (iv).
As spatial analysis shows us, regions are considered homogeneous
whenever neighbouring areas exhibit similar patterns in relation
to (at least) one common feature. Graph 5, for example, depicts
two rather extreme cases with very little homogeneity in case A
and two homogeneous blocks in case B. In modern spatial research
a test for homogeneity of regions is done through the so-called
spatial autocorrelation analysis:
Cliff et al. (1975, p. 145) define spatial autocorrelation in the
following manner:
"In general, if high values of a variable in one area are asso-
ciated with high values of that variable in neighbouring areas,
we say that the set of areas exhibits positive spatial autocorre-
lation with regard to this variable".
2


















To show this one needs more information than the average or
total numbers of small traders. We must be sure that banks and
small traders "meet", that is to say a large number of Bank
Perkreditan Rakyat branches correlate with a significant amount
of small traders: The correlation coefficient between the dis-
tribution of all Bank Perkreditan Rakyat's branches and the
distribution of small traders over 12 Indonesian provinces was
0.8881 for 1984. It is worth mentioning that as far as the
different "realizations" of BPR are concerned, Bank Desa was
the most highly correlated (0.8939) and Bank Pasar (0.6939) was
the lowest.
2
The numerator is nothing but a covariance standardised by the
denominator which is a weighted variance.- 19 -
Graph 5
Similar and Dissimilar Patterns of Neighbouring
(Regional) Cells
Case A Case B
Source: A. D. Cliff/P. Haggett a.o.: Elements of Spatial Structure,
A Quantitative Approach, Cambridge 1975, p. 151.- 20 -
with n = sample size
z± = x± - x
x. = number of small traders in region i
x = mean number of small traders over all regions
w. . = 1 if the i-th and j-th provinces are contiguous and 0
otherwise
Also, Cliff et al. (1975, p. 32) showed that:
(2) max |r| Si whenever
n n n
(3) W
2 Var(zi) 5 n
2 Var ( Z wi. z.) ; W = Z E w±.
The significance of computed r values (r.) can be tested with the
help of the so-called Fisher-Transformation, as the expected
value of r,
(4) E(r) = (-n-1)"
1 = rQ
follows approximately a standard-normal distribution with mean
zero and variance 1;
(5) rQ




(6) T = _ * N(0,l), with
°Z
(7) Z = \ In ( \*_\ ) and
(8) a7 = (n - 3)
 2 (Hauser 1981, p. 190)
To illustrate the rationale of spatial autocorrelation as a tool
of analysis, Cliff and others put forward: "spatial autocorre-
lation in the incidence of liver and lung cancer in England and- 21 -
Wales" was found. "That is, certain regional clusters of coun-
ties in these countries had statistically abnormally high/low
rates of occurrence of cancer of these organs. Identification of
these areas may be suggestive of particular local environmental
factors which might contribute to this increased/decreased in-
cidence" (Cliff et al. 1975, pp. 145/146). In our context, common
"local environmental factors" are taken as - given small trader's
credit activities - a comparable high demand for informal
credits, as this helps to explain small trader's presence .
In other words: We take the homogeneity of a well-defined region
with regard to the distribution of small traders as an indicator
2
for the spatial intensity of informal credit demand .
To make our argument clear, let us consider first Case A in Graph
5 in which high (shaded) and low (white) values of a given
variable totally alternate: spatial autocorrelation is then
negative (r = -1) . For Region A it is impossible to say that a
comparable high informal credit demand which "draws" small
traders into the, cells is a relevant, observable spatial
4
phenomenon. On the contrary, in Case B (r = 0.45) the shaded
cells can be lumped together to a block which is presumably
characterized by a strong presence of borrowers who attract small
traders in a similar way: Region B is characterized by two homo-
geneous segments, one of them strongly affected by the comparable
presence of informal credit demand.
E. v. Boventer explains this "duality phenomenon" in the frame-
work of demand for/supply of consumer goods: "Da die Praferen-
zen der Konsumenten und damit die Struktur der Nachfrage nach
Konsumgutern unter anderem eine Funktion des Standorts sind,...
implizert jede Veranderung der Standortstruktur der Produktion
auch ceteris paribus, eine Veranderung der Konsumstruktur des
Landes..." (v. Boventer 1962, p. 13).
"Spatial autocorrelations arise because the properties of a
place are not simply a function of other properties of that
place but are affected by its ties to other places and the
flows of influence that accompany these ties" (Cliff et al.
1975, p. 147).
3 Cliff et al. 1975, p. 152.
4 Cliff et al. 1975, p. 152.- 22 -
Table 2 depicts the computed spatial autocorrelation coeffi-
cients, when the total sample (26 provinces) is compared with a
sub-sample, where Bank Perkreditan Rakyat can be found (12 pro-
vinces) .
For both cases, a tendency towards a stronger spatial autocorre-
lation can be seen until 1979. At the end of 1984, on the other
hand, spatial autocorrelation has declined heavily; for the eco-
nomy as a whole we would expect this trend to be brought about
last but not least by the financial reforms of June 1, 1983 and
the repercussions it should have had on the size of the informal
credit market, and on informal credit demand, respectively. This
implies the conviction that there has been a shift from informal
to bank-tied credit demand.
More interesting in our context is the insignificance of r for
the bank provinces in 1984: The decline in homogeneity (in com-
parison with 1979) is far greater than for the all-provinces-
sample. Therefore, we presume that - among other things - the
efforts of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat to draw credit demand have had
some success.
In terms of Graph 5 the decline in the homogeneity index for the
bank-provinces-subsample can be easily illustrated: the so far
rather monolithic shaded block has started to crumble as the
forces which held it together are weakening...
Most of the bank provinces are concentrated in Jawa and it is a
well known fact of Indonesian economic policy that this region
is characterized by more interlinkages and a stronger diffusion
of impacts than other parts of Indonesia. Therefore, overall
liberalization effects will be felt primarily in Jawa and also





1977 r = 0.5292
Significance H,. rejected at the 0.01 level
HQ : r = -0.04 (rQ)
r = 0.4335
Significance H_ rejected at the 0.1 level
HQ : r = -0.09 (rQ)
1978 r = 0.5728 r = 0.5139
Significance H_ rejected at the 0.05 level
HQ : r = -0.09 (rQ)
to
U>
1979 r = 0.6452 r = 0.5882
Significance H_ rejected at the 0.05 level
HQ : r = -0,09 (rQ)
1984 r = 0.4140
Significance Hn rejected at the 0.05 level
HQ : r = -0.04 (rQ)
r = 0.2592
Significance Hn cannot be rejected
HQ : r = -0.09 (rQ)
The data for 1980 and 1981 were not complete enough to compute the index.
Source; Own computations.- 24 -
VI. Summary and Policy Conclusions
Turning back to our initial question of what Bank Perkreditan
Rakyat could and can do in Indonesia in helping to integrate
financial markets, we have found some (but weak) evidence that
they contributed to the dampening of the size of trade-tied
credit activities. We will make plain our conclusion through
Table 3:




















role with re- a__ tained against
gard to other banks (due to
informal credit segmentation?)
suppliers
decreasing position weak- position weak- position weak-
a_1 ened by other a— ened by other a__ ened by compet-
informal credit informal credit ing banks
suppliers suppliers
Source: Tables 1, 2.- 25 -
In relation to the bank-provinces and in comparison, with 1977 we
find situation a12 present in 1978, which was alternated by a32
in 1979. Only 1984 gives hope for a change towards a,,... This
sequency is not surprising. In their first stage of implemen-
tation, small banks of a new type can be satisfied with "com-
plementing" informal credit transactions if they are able to
effect anything at all. all. Before they are in a position to
compete with traders for customers it is more likely that other
types of informal credit arrangements challenge the monopolistic
power of small traders. Later on, small banks themselves become
"smart" enough to pull the customers over their tables...
This investigation is not contradictory to the conviction that
"desirable" forms of informal credit supply as credit coopera-
tives, savings and credit associations should receive some sort
of legal status - not to be associated with external assistance,
as such support would tend to make these self-help organizations
less independent (Fischer 1987, p. 32) - to complement the role
of the organized banking sector. However, it remains a task of
formal financial policy to face those forms of informal money
lending that are connected with a considerable degree of exploi-
tation.
From an overall economic perspective, the introduction of a new
type of small banks may overcome some "defects" in formal Indo-
nesian credit supply and ban - to some extent - undesired types
of informal credit arrangements and thereby contribute to finan-
cial integration. But BPR's macroeconomic importance (see above)
is too small to alleviate the larger shortcomings in Indonesia's
banking sector: the oligopolistic structure, with state banks
still playing a dominating role, hampers a sound financial de-
velopment. But this would be another topic that goes beyond the
scope of this paper.- 26 -
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